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Euro Elections 2009 – Germany 
 
1. Background 
Germany was amongst the group of six countries who created the European 
Coal and Steel Community in 1951 which laid the foundations for the 
emerging European integration process and the subsequent creation of the 
European Economic Community under the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Germany 
has traditionally been a pro-European member states and adopted a leading 
role in the setting European integration agenda in close partnership with 
France. Successive German governments have been in favour of the full 
parlamentarisation of the European Union by expanding the powers of the 
European parliament. Germany consequently took part in the first proper 
elections of the European parliament in 1979 with an overall turnout of 65.7 
per cent, which was higher than the European Community average of 65.7 
per cent (Bale 2008).  
 
Germany has played a leading role in the core  projects of the European 
Union, such as creation of the Single Market in 1993, the Single European 
currency in 1999 and the enlargement towards ten new member states in 
Central and Eastern Europe in 2004 and 2007. It has also promoted 
institutional reform in the wake of the creation of the creation of the European 
Union under the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 and been actively engaged in the 
process of drafting a constitutional treaty for the EU. Germany remained a 
strong supporter of the treaty after it had been rejected in public referenda in 
France and the Netherlands in 2005 and again in its revised form as the 
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Lisbon Treaty in Ireland in 2008.  The German grand coalition under Angela 
Merkel had not only been instrumental in relaunching the constitutional treaty 
at the Lisbon summit in December 2007 but also in opposing calls for the 
abandonment of the process of institutional reform in the wake of the first Irish 
referendum. The German parliament ratified the Lisbon Treaty after a 
parliamentary vote on September 25th 2009. The German Federal 
Constitutional Court had previously examined the treaty and issued a decision 
on it on after the EP elections on June 27th. The decision was a response to a 
constitutional appeal put forward by a group of populist Eurosceptics lead by 
CSU politician Peter Gauweiler, who argued that the treaty would undermine 
the sovereignty of the German parliament and the regional chamber, the 
Bundesrat.  The resulting ruling confirmed that the treaty was in principle 
consistent with the principles of the German basic law. At the same time the 
court emphasised that democratic legitimacy under the current constitutional 
setting must remain on the national level. The FCC consequently determined 
a definite check on further integration steps should these be decided by 
policy-makers in the future.  Parliament was granted the right to ratify it on the 
condition that the constitutional arrangements for the enhanced participatory 
rights of the German national parliament would be clarified (Federal 
Constitutional Court 2009).  
 
In spite of the prevailing pro-European consensus amongst the German 
political elite, German European policy has in recent years become more 
pragmatic. In contrast to their predecessors in the Bonn republic, who had 
experienced the trauma of the Second World War, the younger generation of 
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German leaders in the Bonn republic no longer consider European integration 
as a question of war or peace and approach individual policy areas 
increasingly on the basis of a cost-benefits analysis (Hyde-Price 2000: 5). The 
German political elite has consequently been much bolder than in the past in 
openly defending their country’s national interest, particularly in the area of 
migration and enlargement. Prime examples for this are the insistence of the 
red-green coalition led by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (1998-2005) on 
transitional periods restricting the free movement of workers from the new 
CEE member states and the reluctance of his CDU successor as Chancellor, 
Angela Merkel, to agree to further enlargement in the near future. Under 
Merkel Germany has supported France in putting the brakes on the Turkish 
membership bid and has generally been reluctant to support further waves of 
enlargement. In this respect Merkel has introduced the notion of ‘finality’ into 
the debate on the future of European integration when she spoke about the 
need to concentrate on the deepening of political integration and to limit 
further membership offers to the countries of the Western Balkans (Merkel 
2009). Overall the EU has become less of a central issue in German domestic 
politics than it was in the past. This is in response to a change in public 
opinion in Germany in recent years, where a growing scepticism towards the 
way the EU operates can be detected. 
 
2. Campaign 
 
Like national elections, European parliament elections in Germany generally 
take place on Sundays and polls close at 6pm. The 2009 EP election was 
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held on June 7th 2009 and coincided with municipal elections in various 
regions across the country. Germany currently sends 99 members to the 
European parliament and they are elected on the basis of a system of 
proportional representation under which voters cast a single vote for one 
party. The 99 seats are subsequently distributed amongst the candidates on 
closed national or regional party lists based on the percentage share of the 
total number of votes each party received. Only parties who gain  at least five 
per cent of the votes cast nationwide are taken into account, which is 
equivalent to the five per cent hurdle which applies in national elections in 
Germany.  
 
Parties can decide to opt for a single national list or to draw up separate lists 
of candidates for individual German regions (Länder). The lists have to be 
submitted two months before the election takes place (68 days for national 
and 66 days for regional elections). Parties or political groups which are not 
permanently represented in the federal parliament, one of the regional 
parliaments or the European parliament, can only participate in the EP 
elections if they obtain 4000 signatures which support their registration for a 
national party list. If they decide to register for participation on the basis of a 
regional list, 2000 signatures is the minimum number required to support the 
application (German Federal Ministry of Justice 1978, p.5).  
 
The campaign for the European parliament elections in Germany is handled 
relatively flexibly and is not strictly limited in terms of a set time period. The 
election date is announced by the German Federal President, which usually 
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marks the start of the campaign, provided that parties have already 
registered. The latter is also the precondition for the equal access to public 
campaign funds from the federal budget. The main restriction to the campaign 
is  a Federal Constitutional Court Ruling which prohibits the publication of any 
public relations materials by government bodies between the official 
announcement of the election date and the actual day of the election. This 
applies to ‘working papers and reports on the efficiency and success of 
government policies’ (German Federal Constitutional Court, 1976, IV 3.a.). 
Opinion polls can be published throughout the campaign, with the exception 
of exit polls, which must not be released before voting has officially ended 
(German Federal Ministry of Justice 2009, paragraph 32). 
 
The influence of the EU Commission representation and the European 
parliament information office on the EP election campaign remains limited. 
The German European parliament information office run a publicity campaign 
based on the theme ‘European elections – Your decision’ which was targeted 
at boosting turnout by informing about voting procedures, the influence of the 
national vote in the European parliament and registration deadlines for the 
electoral register (German European Parliament Information Office 2009). 
 
3. Parties in campaign 
 
A total of 32 parties were officially registered for the EP election campaign in 
Germany in 2009. Apart from the six main political parties which are 
represented in the Bundestag (Christlich Demokratische Union, Christlich 
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Soziale Union, Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, Freie 
Demokratische Partei, Bündnis90/Die Grünen, Die Linke), the following 26 
marginal parties also participated in the campaign in Germany (in alphabetical 
order):  
 
- 50 Plus Das Generationen-Bündnis 
- Ab jetzt... Bündnis für Deutschland, für Demokratie durch Volksabstimmung 
- AUF-Partei für Arbeit, Umwelt und Familie / Christen für Deutschland 
- Aufbruch für Bürgerrechte, Freiheit und Gesundheit 
- Bayernpartei 
- Bürgerrechtsbewegung Solidarität 
- Christliche Mitte – Für ein Deutschland nach Gottes Geboten 
- Deutsche Kommunistische Partei 
- Deutsche Volksunion 
- Die Grauen – Generationspartei 
- Die Republikaner 
- Die Violetten – für sprituelle Politik 
- Europa – Demokratie – Esperanto 
- Familien-Partei Deutschlands 
- Feministische Partei Die Frauen 
- Freie Bürger-Intitiative  
- Für Volksentscheide (Wählergemeinschaft) 
- FW Freie Wähler 
- Mensch Umwelt Tierschutz 
- Newropeans 
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- Ökologisch-Demokratische Partei 
- Partei Bibeltreuer Christen 
- Partei für Soziale Gleichheit, Sektion der Vierten Internationale 
- Piratenpartei Deutschland 
- Renterinnen und Rentner Partei 
- Rentner-Partei-Deutschland 
 
The domestic political context surrounding the election was characterised by a 
rather unusual setting, with the two largest parties CDU/CSU and SPD in a 
grand coalition  government on the federal level and the smaller parties (FDP, 
Bündnis90/Die Grünen, Die Linke) in opposition. Like in national elections, the 
CDU was registered for the EP election in all German regions apart from the 
state of Bavaria, which is the exclusive electoral domain of its sister party, the 
CSU (Christian Social Union). 
 
4. Campaign issues 
 
The 2009 EP election campaign in Germany was substantially influenced by 
domestic issues due to the proximity between the EP election on June 7th and 
the federal general election, which held on September 27th. Like in many other 
EU member states, European parliament elections in Germany tend to be 
dominated by domestic issues and can therefore be characterised as second-
rate elections which test the national political mood (Wüst and Tausenpfund: 
5). The 2009 campaign for the EP elections in Germany was dominated by 
the ongoing effects of the global economic crisis which has fundamentally 
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affected many European economies. Both government and opposition parties 
in Germany used the campaign to promote their own  priorities for national 
and European policy solutions to counter the effects of the crisis. This was 
particularly in relation to finding more efficient ways to regulate the financial 
industries, whose reckless lending and speculation practices had caused the 
crisis and to dealing with the resulting rising levels of unemployment. With 
their focus on this issue the parties consequently responded to the 
overarching desire of German voters to address the issues of unemployment 
(57 per cent) and economic growth (53 per cent) with inflation and purchasing 
power ranking third (48 per cent) (European Parliament 2009: 2). 
 
The electoral campaign took place in a rather unusual setting, with the two 
main parties CDU/CSU and SPD being strung together in a grand coalition. 
Both parties had formed it after the 2005 general election because neither had 
managed to gain enough seats to be able to form a viable coalition with one of 
the smaller parties. The latter hence remained in opposition and were hoping 
to make gains amongst those voters who were dissatisfied with the work of 
the grand coalition. At the same time CDU/CSU and SPD were trying to use 
the European parliament election campaign to test the political mood in the 
run-up to the general election in the autumn. The election manifestos of both 
parties had a distinctly European focus and avoided any reference to 
domestic political disagreements within the grand coalition.   
 
While both parties stressed the need to deepen common European efforts to 
create jobs and to develop an efficient regulatory framework for the financial 
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sector, dividing lines emerged with regard to the future shape of the Single 
European Market. The CDU had to develop its national campaign in the 
context of the clear preference of the European People’s Party’s/Christian 
Democrat group in the European parliament for the acceleration of the Single 
Market liberalisation agenda. One of the main priorities of the EPP for the new 
parliamentary term of the EP were that ‘free competition and a spirit of 
enterprise must be championed as factors that will create jobs and thus 
protect purchasing power’. The EPP also stressed that ‘every barrier to the 
Single Market that falls creates the possibility of new competitive jobs’ (EPP 
2009: 9). In its own campaign the CDU avoided such neoliberal rhetoric and 
instead promoted the German social market economy, which it characterised 
as ‘the inextricable link between a free economic and a solidary social order’ 
as a role model for the rest of the EU (CDU 2009: 2). This foreshadowed the 
rather moderate tone the CDU would adopt during the national general 
election campaign. It was clear that Chancellor Angela Merkel was keen to 
avoid the mistake she had made in 2005, when she promoted herself as a 
radical reformer and consequently allowed the SPD to gain substantial ground 
by warning the electorate that a government formed by the CDU/CSU and the 
FDP would led to the demise of the German model. This explains why the 
CDU  started to adopt the notion that the German social market economy 
should act as a best-practice model for other member states and the Single 
Market as a whole. This had already been promoted by the SPD for a number 
of years and was criticised by the CDU in the past , particularly when Merkel’s 
predecessor Gerhard Schröder campaigned on a platform which advocated 
the social market economy as ‘the German way’, where ‘morality and 
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responsibility certainly apply to the economy and the stock exchange’ 
(Schröder 2002).  This revised position was also supported by the CDU’s 
Bavarian sister party, the CSU, which had in the past been critical of 
tendencies in the CDU to advocate radical reforms of Germany’s economy 
and welfare system. This was emphasised in the joint election announcement 
of both parties published on June 7th 2009, where they praised the social 
market economy as the ‘successful and human answer to the failed systems 
of the socialist planned economy and untamed capitalism’ (CDU/CSU 2009: 
1).  
 
The SPD used the 2009 EP election campaign to highlight the need to 
deepen efforts to create a common European economic and social policy 
framework which should be designed to protect citizens from the effects of 
globalisation and to limit the negative effects of unregulated market 
competition. Like in previous campaigns it promoted the German social 
market economy as a role model for the EU and the rest of the world. One of 
its election slogans was ‘For social market economy – in Europe and the 
world’. The SPD campaign was spearheaded by MEP Martin Schulz,  leader 
of the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the 
EP. Schulz is an outspoken critic of the Barroso Commission, whom he 
accuses of promoting neoliberal policies in the EU. He therefore actively 
campaigned against the reappointment of José Emanuel Barroso as 
Commission president and warned that ‘Conservatives and neoliberals want a 
Europe which puts the free market and competition above all’ (Schulz 2009). 
In its EP election manifesto the SPD presented a contrasting vision by 
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stressing the need to develop a democratic, social and environmental 
regulatory framework for the EU with an emphasis on employees rights, job 
quality, and stronger coordination of national policies in the area of 
employment, welfare, the economy and finance (SPD 2009). The SPD 
campaign reflected the policy priorities in the manifesto of the Party of 
European Socialist Groups in the EP, especially in respect of the call for a 
new European financial architecture with enhanced supervisory powers over 
banks and financial institutions. The PES manifesto called for a regulatory 
system which would offer ‘a new standard for transparency and disclosure’: 
 
 Regulation should cover all financial players (...) The key issues are 
 obligations to disclose asset and regulatory structures, more stringent  
 requirements to inform investors about risks, the limitation of excess 
 debt financing and restrictions on investments (PES 2009: 23). 
 
On the opposition side the largest party in the German Bundestag, the Free 
Democrats (FDP), who aspired to offer themselves as a potential government 
coalition partner for the CDU after the federal election,  predominantly 
targeted their EP election campaign on the future institutional shape of the 
EU. The FDP election manifesto hence highlighted the need to swiftly ratify 
the Lisbon Treaty which would help to make the EU more transparent and 
democratic and to achieve the vision of a ‘Europe of the citizens’ (FDP 2009: 
2). The FDP generally highlighted the need to reduce the level of 
bureaucracy, to enhance civil liberties and to introduce a strict overall 
spending for the EU budget. The completion of the full liberalisation of the 
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Single Market was emphasised as a major priority during the campaign. The 
FDP considered a fully liberalised as essential for the creation of jobs and 
greater consumer welfare through ‘decreasing prices, higher quality and 
greater choice’ (FDP 2009: 9). The FDP’s political group in the EP, the 
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) emphasised similar 
issues (civil liberties, Lisbon Treaty) but also specifically put forward policy 
proposals on the financial crisis and the future of cohesion policy. 
 
B90/Grüne put forward their vision of an EU as a global force for 
environmental protection which ‘responds to the financial, climate and poverty 
crisis by initiating an ecological and social transformation of industrial society’ 
(B90/Grüne 2009: 1). Like the SPD the party criticised the ‘neoliberal 
tendency’ in the EU policy framework in recent years and called for the 
renewed efforts on the EU level to develop joint policies in the area of 
environmental and social protection, civil liberties and peaceful conflict 
resolution. This ‘New Deal’ was especially targeted at achieving social 
solidarity in the societies of the member states by introducing a European 
social pact which determines EU-wide standards on welfare security and 
employee rights (B90/Grüne 2009: 5). Linked to this was the call for the 
stronger regulation of financial markets and the introduction of a European tax 
on financial speculation. 
 
Die Linke concentrated its electoral campaign on the reform of the Single 
European Market in response to the global economic crisis. The LP was the 
most outspoken in condemning the EU’s Single Market agenda as a 
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neoliberal project which had for many years promoted the deregulation of 
financial markets and hence contributed to the resulting crisis:  
 
 Since the Single European Act of 1987 and the Treaty of Maastricht in  
 1992 the predominant policy in the EU substantially contributed to the 
 current financial and economic crisis and to expose democracy to 
 the financial markets (Die Linke 2009: 3). 
 
The party called for the introduction of a new strategy of social integration and 
environmental protection which should be supported by the creation of a 
European economic government with powers to coordinate fiscal, financial 
and economic policy (Die Linke 2009: 6). As expected Die Linke also 
highlighted the need to tighten the regulation of financial markets substantially 
by introducing ‘traffic controls for capital’ and a new tax on financial 
transactions. The party also called for the prohibition of hedge, private equity, 
real estate investment funds and any similar sort of fond. Overall the quality of 
employment was at the centre of its EP manifesto, with the clear opposition 
against the concept of ‘flexicurity’ and the call for ‘good work’ based on 
minimum wages and generally higher wage levels (Ibid p. 9). The future of the 
EU’s security and defence policy was also a major issue in the campaign of 
Die Linke. The party advocated a pacifist relaunch of the EU’s security policy 
which should concentrate exclusively on non-military preventive civilian 
conflict resolution and abolish the existing military capabilities of the EU like 
the Rapid Reaction Force. The call for the abolition of NATO and the closing 
of any US military bases in EU member states showed that the Linkspartei 
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remained firmly in the foreign policy tradition of its East German communist 
predecessor the SED/PDS (Ibid p. 18). Die Linke is a member of the 
European United Left/Nordic Green Left Group in the European parliament, 
who also concentrated their election campaign priorities on the opposition to 
the Lisbon Strategy (in particular the preservation of public services and the 
rejection of the EU services directive) and a civilian EU foreign and defence 
policy (GUE/NCL 2009). 
 
The EP elections in Germany were not characterised by any major dispute 
between domestic policy-makers and the EU. An important issue which was 
put at the forefront of the campaign of all parties was the Lisbon Treaty, which 
was supported by an almost uniform consensus amongst the parties 
represented in the Bundestag, with the exception of Die Linke. The latter 
opposed the treaty on the basis that it would reflect attempts of the EU to 
strengthen the foreign and security pillar of the EU and to ‘react to the 
inevitable consequences of its economic policy which is based on exploitation, 
unfair trade relations and destruction of the environment by military means’ 
(Die Linke 2009: 2). Die Linke also singled out the Lisbon Treaty as a 
document which reflected the continuation of the EU’s neoliberal Single 
Market policy on the basis of ‘liberalisation, deregulation and the privatisation 
of public services’ (Ibid).  B90/Grüne proposed to hold  EU-wide referenda on 
the Charta of Fundamental Rights if the Lisbon Treaty would not be ratified. 
They also confirmed that they aspired to work towards achieving the 
establishment of a ‘slim’ basic EU constitution with essential basic civil and 
social rights as a long-term goal (B90/Grüne 2009: 6). 
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5. Public interest 
 
The German public has in recent years shown decreasing levels of interest in 
EU institutions and policies. This reflects a growing scepticism towards the 
role of the EU in a country that has traditionally been one of the most 
enthusiastic supporter of the European integration process. Germans tend to 
generally still display a relatively high level of trust and support in the EU and 
its institutions when compared to other member states. However, the number 
of Germans who feel that the EU is too bureaucratic and distant from the 
interests of its citizens has risen in recent years. In 2008 56 per cent of 
Germans stated that they did not think that their voice would count in the EU. 
This figure declined slightly in the most recent Eurobarometer (Spring 2009), 
where a slim majority of Germans now thinks that their voice counts within the 
EU (46 per cent), against 44 per cent who think that it does not. Support for 
the European Parliament as an institution remains relatively high, with 49 per 
cent of Germans expressing trust in the EP (European Commission 2009a: 
22-23). A majority of Germans (46 per cent) also supports the expansion of 
the role of the EP in the EU’s institutional setting (European Parliament 2009: 
2). This stands in stark contrast to the declining interest in EP elections in 
Germany. In spite of their general support for the EP as an institution, 
Germans show substantially less interest in EP elections than citizens in other 
member states. 53 per cent of Germans stated that they had no interest in the 
2009 EP elections, which is a higher figure than in 13 other member states, 
with the lowest number of those showing no interest recorded in Greece 
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(European Commission 2009b: 4). These figures are reflected in the general 
trend with regard to turnout in EP elections in Germany, which has declined 
from the peak of 65.73 per cent in the first election in 1979 to the lowest 
turnout of only 43.3 per cent in the latest 2009 elections. As Figure 1 shows 
Germans follow the general trend amongst the EU citizens towards abstention 
from EP elections, with the EU-27 average turnout in the 2009 elections 
standing at 43 per cent. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Turnout in EP elections 1979-2009  
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Like in many other EU member states the reasons for the decline in turnout at 
EP elections in Germany seems to be less a reflection of a scepticism about 
the role of the EP. It is rather an expression of a general feeling of 
remoteness amongst citizens from the decision-making processes in the EU, 
which is linked to the perception that they do not have enough information on 
the role of individual institutions. The EU is hence increasingly seen as an 
institution ‘where the governments of the member states exchange views and 
makes decisions and less as a location where they can participate in 
decisions’ (Hegewald and Schmitt 2009 :16). The granting of further powers to 
the EP has not managed to reverse this trend, even in pro-integrationist 
countries like Germany, which makes it likely that the discussion on the EU’s 
perceived lack of democratic accountability is far from over in the wake of the 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
6. Result 
The outcome of the 2009 EP election in Germany reflects the fact that those 
voters who participated in the poll considered it to be mainly as an opportunity 
to express dissatisfaction with the domestic grand coalition government. As 
expected, the parties of the governing coalition (CDU, CSU, SPD) lost votes 
while the smaller parties made gains. Particularly the CDU faced losses 
(minus 5.9 per cent), in spite of generally high approval ratings for Chancellor 
Angela Merkel and favourable domestic opinion polls for CDU and CSU. The 
CSU lost marginally (minus 0.8 per cent).  As figure 2 shows, the CDU 
remained just above the 30 per cent mark while the SPD again had to accept 
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a poor result with barely 20 per cent (minus 0.7 per cent of the votes) of the 
share of the votes.  
 
Figure 2: EP 2009 election result in Germany 
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Source: Bundeswahlleiter 
This was significant because the SPD’s showing substantially weakened the 
standing of the Socialist Group in the EP. The result foreshadowed a poor 
outlook for the SPD at the upcoming federal elections and put its leadership, 
particularly the leading candidate for the federal election, foreign minister 
Frank Walter Steinmeier, under substantial pressure1. The EP elections 
showed that the SPD had not benefitted from its role as junior partner in the 
grand coalition and was also failing to convince voters that it had the right 
answers to the economic challenges following the global crisis. In addition, as 
the CDU and Chancellor Merkel presented themselves in their new role as the 
                                                 
1
 Frankfurter Rundschau ‘Geballte Ratlosigkeit’, 9 June 2009. 
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guardian of the German market economy it became extremely difficult for the 
SPD to promote itself as the social conscience of the government. In spite of 
the CDU losses the EP elections had made it likely that the federal election in 
September would lead to the formation of a CDU-CSU/FDP coalition. This 
was mainly due to the fact that voters strengthened the smaller parties who 
were in opposition on the national level, which particularly benefitted the FDP 
(plus 4.9 per cent) and to a lesser extent Die Linke (plus 1.4 per cent) and 
B90/Grüne (plus 0.2 per cent). The strong FDP showing boosted the party’s 
confidence in its ability to win enough votes at the national general election to 
form a government with the CDU/CSU2.  
 
The EP election result gave a good prediction of the share of the votes the 
parties could expect at the subsequent federal general election in September. 
The actual result of the national poll closely mirrored the EP election result 
which illustrates the character of EP elections as tests of the national political 
mood in which voters vote predominantly on domestic issues. In the federal 
general election the CDU received 27.3 per cent of the votes, with the CSU at 
6.5 per cent, which brought their total share of the votes up to 33.8 per cent. 
Their ability to form a government was boosted by the FDP’s strong showing 
at 14.6 per cent. The SPD received the worst national share of the votes in its 
history and managed to gain only 23 per cent, which was widely considered 
as an electoral disaster for the party. The EP elections had therefore set the 
trend for a poor showing of the SPD which the party was unable to reverse 
during the national election campaign that followed the EP elections in June. 
                                                 
2
 Die Welt, ‘Westerwelle sieht sich auf dem Weg in die Regierung’, 9 June 2009. 
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Bündnis90/Grüne (10.7) and Die Linke (11.9) also remained very close to 
their EP election results in the national election. 
 
Germany was allocated the largest number of seats in the EP (99) under the 
institutional reforms that had been determined in the Nice Treaty. This was an 
acknowledgement of the fact that Germany is the member states with the 
largest size of the population and a compensation for the failure of the 
Schröder government to convince France and the UK to grant Germany the 
largest number of votes in the Council during the Nice negotiations 
(Schweiger 2007: 97). Figure 3 shows that out of the 99 seats in the EP the 
largest share  is situated in the EPP political group, with CDU and CSU being 
represented with 42 seats of the total of 265 allocated to the group. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Seats allocated to German parties in the EP political groups 
               after the 2009 election 
 
 
Source: Bundeswahlleiter (2009) Europawahl 2009: Ergebnisse in  
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             Deutschland. 
 
 
Germany is also represented with three vice-presidents of the EP, Rainer 
Wieland from the CDU, Dagmar Roth-Behrendt from the SPD and Silvia 
Koch-Mehrin from the FDP, who is also vice-chairman of the ALDE group. 
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